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Structured abstract
Purpose – The social network analysis of criminal networks at both the ego and socio-centric
level is well established. This purpose of this article is to expand this literature by examining 
a criminal network within the social capital lens, with an analysis of the Ponzi, investment 
fraud of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS).
Design/methodology/approach – Case study of the BLMIS financial fraud. The article uses 
a social capital theoretical lens, with archival sources taken from the court records of Madoff 
v NY, to include victim impact statements and the defendant’s Plea Allocution.
Findings – Financial crime literature can be expanded with a social capital analysis 
which facilities a socio-economic appreciation
Research limitations/implications – Each financial crime is of its time, while there are 
recurring socio-economic characteristics. 
Originality/value – A social capital analysis of financial crime draws attention to 
‘human factor’ in white collar crime. 
Keywords: social capital; affinity fraud; Ponzi fraud; investment fraud; Madoff; and 
criminal profiling.
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2
Madoff’s Ponzi Investment Fraud: A Social Capital Analysis 
Introduction
On the 29th June 2009 at the sentencing trial, Ira Lee Sorkin, speaking for all of Madoff’s 
attorneys acknowledged that their client was a ‘deeply flawed individual’ (“Sentencing 
Transcript dated June 29, 2009.” p.31).  Sorkin continued by pleading for leniency, arguing 
that his client had ‘turned himself in’, and made a full confession that expressed regret: 
Madoff had also agreed to fully cooperate with the recovery of investments, though the judge 
noted that he failed to be fully cooperative (Ibid., p.p. 45-46). The defense attorney further 
stressed that they had based their request for a 12-year sentence on the average length of 
sentencing for previous acts of severe fraud (Ibid., pp. 32-33). As Sorkin elaborated, a 
sentence of 12 years for the 71 years old Madoff could be just short of a life sentence, with 
the slim prospect of his client living out his final years, ‘impoverished and alone’ and would 
signal that justice would not be swayed by ‘mob vengeance’. Judge Denny Chinn however, 
remained unimpressed and specifically dismissed the notion of ‘life expectancy analysis’, 
preferring to hand down, in his words, a ‘symbolic verdict’ 1 of 150 years or 1, 800 months 
for the $65 billion investment fraud 2: Madoff would be 221 before he could be considered for
release on November 14th 2139. 
It is not easy to elicit sympathy for Madoff, but the sentence was indubitably severe for 
someone who had pleaded guilty and claimed sole responsibility for the crimes. 3 One can 
further question the sentencing judge’s assertion that ‘by any monetary measure the fraud was
unprecedented’, as after adjustments for inflation, Ivar Krueger’s inter-war, and John Laws 
eighteenth century frauds were on the same scale. A converse view is that the scale and 
operating strategy of Madoff’s fraud would be familiar to any white-collar criminologist, or 
financial historian, as the economist J. K. Galbraith has noted:
‘The man who is admired for the ingenuity of his larceny is almost always 
rediscovering some earlier form of fraud. The basic forms are all known, have all 
been practiced. The manners of capitalism improve. The morals may not’ (Galbraith, 
1979, p. 75)
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From this perspective Madoff started out with a commonplace affinity fraud, 4 and 
subsequently grew it into investment fund fraud open to anyone gullible enough to invest. 5 
Madoff was also following a familiar ‘rob Peter to pay Paul bubble,’ 6 later termed ‘Ponzi 
scheme’7 to lure in his investors.  
The commonplace nature of the Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities (BLMIS) fraud did 
prevent the case achieving a level of infamy not witnessed in recent times.8 In short, this 
investment fraud attained a symbolism in excess of being just another example of a gifted con
man swindling the affluent out of their investments, rather Madoff came to personifying the 
discredited values that led to the financial crash of 2007: to some critics he became 
responsible for the crash (Hurt, 2009, p. 961). Thus, the investment fraud, with its scale and 
reach, length of operation, and also deft playing of the media by the ‘victims’, or survivors as 
they termed themselves, (Lewis, 2012, p.p. 47-73).  quickly established wider symbolism and
significance. The extensive public interest in the case 9 indicated that while being a typical 
investment fraud, there was also something remarkable about Madoff and his 
investors/victims. 
To meet the wider interest in the case a number of mainly descriptive accounts of the 
investment fraud have been published, (Arvedlund, 2009; and Markopolos, 2010) and this 
developing literature includes a sub-genre written from a social network perspective (Baker 
and Faulkner 2004; Nash, Bouchard and Malm, 2013). These structural analyses of criminal 
networks draw attention to the importance of constructing and maintaining socially 
embedded networks to provide proximity between criminal and victim. Social networks are 
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therefore vital for facilitating fraud as they create proximity. In the syntax of conmen 
(confidence men), social networks allowed ‘ropers’ to identify the investors, (the ‘marks’) to 
be ‘roped in, told the tale, and then fleeced’ (Lewis, 2012, p.14).
These structural analyses are also analogous with well-established theories from criminology,
which consider the personality traits and social activities of white-collar crime, 10 to analyze 
the dis-utilities associated with their criminal networks. 11 There is however, a limitation of 
these structural approaches in that they under-report the human and qualitative qualities of 
personal interaction and social groups, as the social capital theorist Robert Putnam has 
discussed: ‘Knowledge needs a social context to be meaningful’ (2000, p.p. 170-180).
Accordingly, the extant social network (sometimes called structural) analyses of the BLMIS 
investment fraud need to be expanded with an examination of the social context of Madoff’s 
and BLMIS’s networks. This article will therefore expand the social network/structural 
perspective to analyze the qualitative social context of the fraud’s embedded network 
interaction; that is to focus on the network interactions that are dependent on the ‘persistence 
of human contact’ (Cohen and Prussic, 2005, p.p. 179-180). 
The social capital concept encompasses the structural social network analysis (SNA) 
favoured by criminologists, who have studied the exploitative and deleterious effects of 
socially embedded networks and transactions (Baker and Faulkner, 2004; Nash et al, 2013). 
These analyses have already comprehensively reviewed the social network characteristics of 
BLMIS considering the morphology (shape and structure) of the investment fraud’s ego-
centric and socio-centric networks. 12 In contrast, this analysis will focus on qualitative 
relational interactions, to emphasise the human factors (embedded social relations, and 
intangibles such as trust and reputation) associated with network structures. The social capital
lens therefore adds a qualitative element to SNA, expanding the perspective to emphasise the 
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persistent social (capital) realities of social interaction in white-collar crime. The ambition of 
this article is to examine these qualitative embedded, relational social realities that are built 
up over time, through reiterated interactions to create the social fabric of criminal network 
structures. 
The article will focus a social capital lens on Madoff and his BLMIS investment fraud, as 
well as other well-known frauds, to identify that investment fraud and white collar crime in 
general is driven as much by socio-economic insights and the consequent exploitation of 
social capital processes, as by sophisticated insights into corrupt financial engineering or 
other novel crime techniques. 
The article will proceed by presenting a qualitative and relational understanding of the social 
capital concept that is relevant for this analysis into investment fraud. The subsequent section 
will analyze the investment fraud from a social capital perspective and will be based on 
various sources including archival material from New York V Madoff’s court documents.  
The article will continue with a consideration of Madoff’ and his BLMIS investment fraud’s 
significance in criminal history. The article will then conclude with a critical discussion of the
key contemporary and recurring historical features of fraud with reference to BLMIS. 
The Social Capital Perspective on the Economy and its Application to White-collar 
Crime and Investment Fraud
Social capital research has developed exponentially in recent years, which has been discussed
in a number of literature reviews of the concept’s development (Portes, 1998; Foley & 
Edwards, 1999; Paldam, 2000; Adler & Kwon, 2002; Fields, 2003; Lee, 2009). 
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The most prominent contemporary social capital scholar is Putnam, who has promoted 
social capital’s socio/political importance to analyse America’s declining civicness 
(1993, 2000, 2004). Putnam supported his ‘declentionist’ narrative, which refers to 
America’s declining ‘civicness’, with detailed statistics gathered from proxy indicators 
(‘Putnam’s Instrument’, 2000). Putnam social capital treatment was influenced by the 
communitarian ideas of Etzioni (1988); and the communitarian perspective, dating from
de Tocqueville’s (1835/1956) analysis on the USA’s ‘associational democracy’ and 
‘worship of money’, are influential in framing contemporary social capital literature and 
have direct relevance for this article. 13 For this article’s focus into fraud Fukuyama’s 
neo-Tocquevillian political treatment, which emphasises the importance of culture, trust
and morality in communities for economic efficiency is also significant (1995).
The unifying thread of social capital literature concerned with economic activity 14 is a 
reliance on assumptions drawn from rational action theory, which in turn depend on an 
exchange theory view of social interaction. Flavio Comin for instance, has commented on 
social capital literature’s focus on the, ‘instrumentalization of social relations’ (2008, p. 629). 
For illustration, ‘…social contacts affect the productivity of individuals and groups’ (Putnam,
2000, p.19). The pervasiveness of rational action theory is evident in the conceptual 
understandings of leading social capital scholars. 15 It follows from this conceptual framing 
orthodoxy that social capital offers greater productivity returns, and in consequence it is 
desirable to develop networks and the associated norms of reciprocity, as these will lead to 
positive utility outcomes. Therefore, it is rational to develop social capital for its utility 
returns: an understanding that chimes with the utility maximising ‘homo economicus’ of the 
‘formalist school’. There are numerous criticisms of end-means economic rationality; 16 
nevertheless in terms of fraud ends means rationality relevance is obvious: Madoff and other 
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fraudsters such Ponzi can be understood as an extreme economic rationalist who consistently 
pursued their own economic utility, unencumbered with ethical constraints or with limited 
ethical constraints.  17 Thus if, ‘…social capital consists of relations between people’ 
(Coleman, 1990, p. 316), white collar criminal character analyses suggest that they are 
unscrupulous enough to instrumentalize these socio-economic relations ruthlessly for their 
own self-interested gain. 
Networks are also central to any social capital analysis; as to whether an exclusive network 
focus captures the entirety of social capital is disputed.  For illustration, one key social capital
debate concerns the role of the Internet in facilitating social capital. Nan Lin consider that we 
are living in a ‘Golden age of Connectivity’ (1999, 2001) Conversely, Robert Putnam (2005) 
is skeptical over the benefits of technology in creating social capital, arguing the ease of entry
and exit to on-line networks results in them being no more likely to creates social capital than
access to a telephone directory: that is, they only offer the potential to create connections 
(ibid: 9).  Prusak and Cohen concur, making a related point that the absence of norms and 
trust are the ‘greatest barrier to using the Internet as a tool to create social capital’ 
(2001, p. 172) and that the ease of entry and the openness to Web makes it difficult to 
agree and then to enforce organizing principles and behavior. Their view is to stress the 
significance of ‘…the organic and self-reinforcing nature of social capital for embedding 
social relations.’ 18 Building these social relations facilitates trust, to develop over time in
repeated social interactions, and it is this trust (a function of a relationship) that Madoff 
and other fraudsters are adept at constructing and then exploiting. 
The returns of social capital have been identified as ‘access, timing and referrals’ (Coleman, 
1990, p. 190) and there is a consensus that by social capital facilitates the development of 
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intangible assets. These intangibles are referred to by different names with the most emphasis
placed on reputation in conceptual literature. For example, Burt interprets it as relational 
asset (2005:100-101) and has developed a social capital theory of reputation based on 
network closure, which he bisects into ‘broadband and echo’ (2005). According to Coleman 
reputation is a consequence of social capital and its closure mechanism (1990); Lin interprets 
reputation as a social capital reflection (2005); Fukuyama equates it with recognition (1995: 
359); Nahapiet and Ghoshal view it as deriving from relational factors (1998: 252); and 
Putnam understands reputation as a result of dense social networks (2000: 136). Therefore, 
though there are a number of different theoretical perspectives on the relationship 
between social capital and reputation, there is also a consensus that there is a robust 
connection. In consequence, this article will examine how Madoff build up his intangible
assets, such as reputation, an essential component of his fraud, as he was well aware:  
‘The regulators get calls all the time,’ Madoff says. They didn’t investigate, ‘because I
had the reputation at the time for being the gold standard. I had all the credibility. 
Nobody could believe at that time that I would do something like that. Why would I? 
Stupidity – that is why. But remember that when people asked me about the strategy, it
made sense. I was big, credible’ (Gelles & Tett, April 8, Financial Times, 2011).
Social capital is however, more than the sum of its parts, and its essential qualities therefore 
need to be considered synoptically, accordingly any sub-divisions should be understood as 
complementary, inter-related and fluid. 19 
Court Documents: The Degradation Ceremony
The purpose of victim impact statements is to permit victims to personalize and detail the 
impact of crime, which is termed therapeutic justice. 20 In the United States V Bernard L. 
Madoff, 167 substantial statements were submitted, from which the prosecution chose to 
submit 113 substantial statements, with 9 permitted to speak at the sentencing trial. The 
statements therefore comprise the views of only a fraction of the defrauded. 21 For example, 
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financial institutions, which suffered the biggest losses, such as Banco Santander ($2.87 
billion) and Bank Medici ($2.1 billion), as well as charities and celebrity investors, did not 
submit any statements. The statements are therefore unrepresentative, but valuable for their 
role in ‘shaping the Madoff narrative’ 22 in the sphere of public opinion. One can also 
speculate that statements articulated views shared by other BLMIS investors and five themes 
can be identified. 
The first theme articulated in the court documents was an acute sense of Madoff’s treachery, 
not only to individual investors but more so to the wider community, as one investor stated: 
‘What Bernard L. Madoff did far transcends the loss of money. It involves his 
betrayal of the virtues of people hold dearest-love, friendship, trust-and all so he 
can eat at the finest restaurants, stay at the most luxurious resorts, and travel on 
yachts and private jets. Ha has truly earned his reputation for being the most 
despised person to in America today’ (New York v Madoff, sentencing transcript” 
2009,  p. 20).
Affinity fraud can be interpreted as an ‘hate crime’ (Fairfax, 2003) and one can speculate as 
to whether there was an element of self-loathing about Madoff 23 manifested in defrauding his
own ethnic/religious community, or more prosaically he targeted this community out of mere 
opportunism.  In overview, the statements constantly allude to a betrayal of community-based
trust.  A number of statements also drew attention to reports and commentaries that 
stereotyped the investors, 43 being interested in money, which is ironic as it has been 
suggested that the fraud was facilitated by investors not conducting due diligence: the 
investors, ‘people who knew how to make money’ 44   were desperate to avoid living up to the
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negative stereotypes which were subsequently reinforced when the fraud 
collapsed. 45 
Thus, there was a sense of betrayal of trust, not confined to individual, egocentric relations; 
but at the communal, socio-centric level.  A key part of the Madoff’s BLMIS operations was 
to target his own community to exploit the ties that create trust, respect and friendship, which 
are usually considered an asset of such groups. This is a common approach in affinity fraud 46
and also in religious based frauds. 47. Madoff and his co-religionist associates targeted their 
own faith/ethnic community, thus creating close proximity with those of a similar background
who shared a sense of identification, which can be understood as ‘…the process whereby 
individuals see themselves as one with another person or group of people’. 48 In social capital 
theory the same observation is made in Putnam’s bonding capital,49 which notes the 
drawbacks of race segregation, as well as in Lin’s conclusion there is a preference for 
homophilious interactions in networks; that is, ‘birds of a feather will flock together’. 50 
These observations are also detailed in Shibutani’s, ‘Reference Groups as Perspectives’ a 
concept that notes that economic activity is often based on shared socio-cultural and religious
values and characteristics.51
Madoff thus established his an affinity fraud, which also made it harder to detect as ‘cautious 
skepticism is replaced by social banter’ (Reed, 2007). Affinity frauds also tend to last longer 
than other types of fraud because of group cohesion. 52 
Madoff was also ambitious to expand his fraud and acted in accordance with the precepts of 
relational sociology understanding that:
‘People and groups who do well are somehow better connected’. 53
11
Madoff therefore followed a pattern familiar to other affinity fraudsters, to exploit familial 
and friendship ties, as his: ‘… early investment clients were friends and relatives in the New 
York Jewish Community’. 54 His most prominent cheer-leader was his father-in-law, Sol 
Alpern whose boasting about Madoff uncanny ability to provide excellent returns for his 
investors enticed many new investors: his enthusiasm was in part related to having lent 
Madoff $50,000 to launch the broker-dealer business.  55
Furthermore, Madoff’s initial investors were lured into the fraud in social and non-
commercial settings, for instance in the Catskills were New York Jews ‘vacationed’. In this 
relaxed social setting Madoff, who was an expert at inspiring trust, charmed his way via 
family ties into the good auspices of retired attorneys, teachers and other professionals, to the 
extent that they invested heavily with his supposedly ‘conservative’ investment fund. 56
As the business expanded, Madoff continued to employ more and more of his family 
including his brother Peter who joined him in the business in 1970, as the firm's chief 
compliance officer. Later, Madoff's sons Andrew and Mark worked for the company as 
traders. Peter's daughter, Shana, became a rules-compliance lawyer for the trading division of
her uncle's firm, and his son, Roger, joined the firm before his death in 2006. 
Madoff understood the importance of being embedded in a trust-based community, which is a
socio-economic insight, the term embeddedness being first coined by Karl Polanyi who 
argued that: 
‘…man’s economy, as a rule is submerged in social relationships. He does not act to
safeguard his individual interests in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to
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safeguard his social standing, his social claim, his social assets. He values material
goods so far as they serve this end’.  52
Madoff, for illustration donated heavily to ethnic (Jewish) charities, became a member of the 
Board of trustees for Yeshiva University, and proclaimed his devotion to the Jewish religion 
and culture. Madoff was also perceptive enough to recognize that charity, and more generally 
philanthropic activities in his own community were an excellent opportunity to develop his 
feeder networks. This approach fitted in with Madoff’s preferred sales pitch of avoiding 
financial or ‘capital introduction’ parties, which would be full of financially savvy investors, 
who would too many awkward questions. Instead, he preferred to target fellow 
philanthropists by word of mouth recommendations, and there was a concerted effort by 
Madoff and other members of his family to court the charity circuit, sitting on the boards of 
many charities and donating money to many others. This networking gave Madoff two main 
paybacks. First, it allowed him access to high society that added luster to his brand: it made 
him more respectable and consequently credible. Second, it allowed him to aggressively 
market his products to gullible charity commissioners and hence provided a lucrative source 
of investors. The success of the Madoff’s in convincing charities to invest an be gauged by 
the reforms being planned to charitable foundations altering their size and structure in order 
to decrease their reliance of ‘personal ties’. 58
Therefore Madoff grasped that affinity fraud depended on being accepted as an upstanding 
member of the community, as in the early stages the community provided the bulk of the 
investors. This perception accords with Fukuyama’s appreciation of culture in economic life 
which concludes: ‘As Adam Smith well understood, economic life is deeply embedded in 
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social life, and it cannot be understood apart from customs, morals, and habits of the society 
in which it occurs. In short, it cannot be divorced from culture’. 59
It is also significant that Granovetter has noted, from a social network perspective, that 
victim/offender relationships in financial scams are based on a surprising level of intimacy. 60 
In Madoff’s fraud it could be claimed that this intimacy was built on community-based trust 
as one observer put it:
‘To stay in Madoff’ game, they agreed to cooperate with his deceptions. They honored
his request to not talk about him or to tell others that he was managing their money. 
They didn’t do due diligence’. 61
In social capital literature it has been contended that levels of trust are related to levels of 
social capital. 62 For example, Fukuyama stresses the importance of trust and ‘ingrained 
ethical habit’ (1995) 63  for ‘lubricating’ market-based transactions. Cohen and Prusak’s view 
is also relevant: 
‘Trust is largely situational: a particular person may be quite trustworthy in one set
of circumstances, but not in another, where particular pressures, temptations, fears,
or confusion may make him unreliable’. 64
Madoff was also expert at gaining trust without giving up a lot of information. This is 
significant as high levels of trust and a culture of shared values facilitate white-collar crime. 
Conversely, in low-trust cultures transactions are scrutinized in detail and economic actors 
are wary of being cheated. Therefore though high trust culture can create economic 
advantages, for instance in terms of reduced transaction costs, 65 at the same time these high 
level of trust create opportunities for fraud.  For example, Madoff followed a typical scam in 
claiming to have privileged ‘insider knowledge’ based on connections. Thus it was taken that 
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Madoff possessed exclusive bridging capital or network brokerage opportunities that offered 
the privileged investors access to highly lucrative investment opportunities. This high level of
trust can be observed in the loyalty of Madoff’s investors with widows recounting how their 
deceased husband’s had implored them, ‘to never sell their Madoff holdings’. 66 In 
consequence, once the fraud collapsed it followed that the statements reflected the perceived 
damage to community trust. 67
Madoff also relied on maintaining a reputation above reproach as a key relational asset and 
for this analysis Burt’s two level reputation generating hypotheses are most apt. Burt’s first 
‘bandwidth hypothesis’ chimes with everyday assumptions in which the actor owns their 
reputation, in the sense that they define their behaviour, which in turn defines their reputation.
68 For instance, Madoff cultivated a brand identity that was conservative and reassuring: 
always immaculately presented, a committed family man and vigorous philanthropist who 
shunned an ostentatious lifestyle. 69 The extended Madoff family were also considered as 
smart, educated, admired and respected: pillars of their community, model Americans, with 
Madoff as a The Wall Street legend. 70 The Madoff’s were also noted for their traditional 
values, and paradoxically were associated with low risk investment strategies: Madoff to his 
cautious investors appeared anti-risk. Further his returns were good, but remained within the 
realms of what a skillful and lucky trader could achieve in a good year 8-12% per annum: 
except Madoff uniquely achieved these returns every year. Thus the fraud was facilitated by 
Madoff apparent conservatism, which gave him the persona opposite to that of a ‘get rich 
quick’ operator. 
Madoff also exploited the processes described in Burt second ‘echo hypothesis’. In this 
hypothesis reputation is not owned by the individual but rather is owned by: ‘…the people in 
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whose conversations it is built, and the goal of those conversations is not accuracy so much 
as bonding between the speakers’. 71  In consequence: ‘The key to establishing a good 
reputation is to get people in closed networks talking to one another’. And: ‘Reputations do 
not emerge from good work directly so much as from colleagues stories about the work…the 
source of the reputation is stories third parties are telling one another’. 72 Madoff grasped that 
positive gossip was essential to maintaining his reputational assets, from this perspective 
reputation is dependent on an individual’s freedom to make judgments. In this hypotheses 
reputation is therefore transcendently motivated. 73 For illustration, Madoff was widely 
admired and much talked about as the former chairman of the NASDAQ stock market, as a 
friend of regulators, and as vice-chairman of the National Association of Securities Dealers, 
the industry’s self-regulatory body. Madoff also understood the value of acts of kindness for 
spreading positive word of mouth, and consequently worked on his ‘good guy’ persona. For 
example, research suggests that employees loved working for the Madoff's and most stayed 
with them till the bitter end.  For instance, in 2002 a rookie trader was seriously injured when 
he was hit by a car, while training for the New York City marathon. ‘I passed out and woke 
up in the emergency room,’ the trader remembers. When he came to, ‘I looked to one side of 
my bed, and my mom and dad were there. On the other side was Bernie’. 74
Madoff further enhanced his reputation by cultivating highly respected network ties that 
could serve as a conduit to channel further victims into the fraud. In social capital literature 
Lin has noted that reputation is promoted by;’ …recruiting actors with a reputation 
established elsewhere in society’. 75 For example, Madoff developed a close commercial 
relationship with Micheal Engler who ran a brokerage firm and enjoyed high status in his 
suburban community based on his exemplary war record. Engler recommended many 
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veterans to invest with Madoff, and these military ties also served to ensnare an extensive 
network of unsuspecting investors who were in turn connected to these veterans. 
In Hebrew Madoff can be described as a Shidduch: a matchmaker; and in behavioural 
economics and Madoff can be termed as a ‘connector’. 76 In network syntax he cultivated 
‘weak’ ties for ‘brokerage benefits’.  
It is further relevant that Coleman’s view was that social capital is more likely to be created 
as an oppositional response, ‘…where one type of actor is weaker in a relationship…the 
actors of this type will be likely to develop social networks that have closure, in order to 
strengthen their position relative to the more powerful type of actor.’ 77 This bonding capital 
has been analyzed in social capital literature by Coleman who noted that robust religious and 
community bonds enabled the Orthodox Jewish community to dominate the New York 
diamond trade, due to the advantages of high levels of trust and consequently low transaction 
costs. 78 The reverse side of this high trust context however, was that a skillful swindler could 
exploit this community resource, in part by emphasizing their ethnic ties. For example the 
Madoff’s stressed their allegiances to Jewish norms.  Ruth Madoff, for illustration co-
authored, ‘The Great Chefs of America Cook Kosher’ (1996) and the Madoff’s donated 
ostentatiously to Jewish charities and universities. Thus although Madoff was described at his
sentencing trial as ‘an equal opportunities destroyer’ 79 the Jewish community suffered 
disproportionately. 
‘The effect on the American Jewish community was viral: 39% of American Jews were
affected in some way, either because an organization or charity they supported had 
been affected by the Madoff crimes (29%) or because someone they knew had been 
affected (17%)’. 80
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The second theme was the vehemence of the victim narrative, which was vituperative and ‘ad
hominem’ in its focus.  For example, ‘He’s and economic terrorist ‘ and a there were a 
number of references comparing Madoff to the devil and to Hitler. ‘May god spare you no 
mercy.’  81 One can speculate that this verbal viciousness was in part derived from the  ‘narcs 
not being cooled out’.82 Madoff was described as a criminal of unheralded wickedness. These 
statements can be also viewed as an attempt to sway public opinion, which was divided with 
a number of reports being less than sympathetic to the victims. 83 
The third theme was in attempting to apportion blame for the fraud onto 
the legal and regulatory authorities. Madoff had focused on cultivating 
trust-based relations with key stakeholders groups from the regulatory, 
legal and police authorities. He had also acted as chairman of the NASDAQ
and as an advisor to the SEC on market structure and other issues. He 
would boast that he had married his family into SEC.  His influence over 
the SEC was such that Markopolos well-founded warnings were ignored: 
‘...it seemed that Madoff had cast a shadow over the SEC’. 84 
Other closed networks were targeted because they offered the potential for rich pickings and 
low levels of financial probing, as the scam developed from an affinity to a more a more 
general investment fraud . For instance Madoff’s scheme targeted entertainers and European 
aristocrats with the pitch of an exclusive opportunity available to select few, but only 
available if they made a quick decision. This secretive word of mouth offer to the privileged 
was often orchestrated by Madoff’s father-in-law, Sol Alpern attracting investors through 
word-of-mouth that amassed an impressive client list, including stars such as Kevin Bacon, 
18
Kyra Sedgewick, John Malkovitch, Steven Spielberg, Larry King, the estate of John Denver 
and the family trust of Henry Kissinger and various European aristocrats, including Lady 
Victoria De Rothschild.
The fourth theme stressed that the victims had suffered losses of unimaginable magnitude. 
For illustration one victim stated that, ‘It is impossible to compare this crime to any past 
criminal act’. 85 This was an attempt to shape the narrative away from that of investor as being
greedy and complicit, to being entirely innocent victims. Thus the sub-text was that the 
investors refused to take any responsibility for what had happened in the con.
The investors were also determined that they should be to be recognized as victims and not as
collaborators. This is a common reaction to the exposure of affinity fraud from the investors’ 
perspective; that is there was a complete denial of culpability at any level. Conversely, 
Madoff remained convinced of the investors shared culpability in the con. 86A consequence of
this refusal of the investors to acknowledge any culpability was a consistent theme in the 
victim statements to blame the SEC and other financial regulators for failing to identify and 
close down BLMIS, and implicitly to lay the grounds for appeals for recompense. 87
 ‘There are many levels of government complicity in this crime. The SEC by its total 
incompetence and criminal negligence, has allowed this psychopath to steal from me 
and steal from the world’. 88
This accusation, moreover had validity as Madoff developed close ties with the SEC by 
training their newly appointed lawyers in the hard to codify, context specific insider 
knowledge of Wall Street, 89 resulting in a tie relationships that (quid pro quo) screened him 
from the concentrated gaze of investigators. This theme of refusing to accept responsibility or
any level of collaboration in the fraud contributed to a wider narrative that the investors were 
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above all else victims, who had been betrayed not only by Madoff, but also by the financial 
regulators who had failed to discharge their regulatory duties and hence the authorities were 
in part culpable and therefore needed to recompense the investor/victims. 
The fifth theme evident from the statements is that investors were determined to portray 
themselves as ordinary Americans. Thus they stressed that not it was not only the super-rich, 
but also the hard-working middle class, and even working class who Madoff had defrauded 
and impoverished. This claim was usually made with reference to being swindled out of their 
saving and hence to be consigned to an indigent old age. Whatever, the veracity of these 
claims, this theme further contributed to the narrative that the investors had not been 
collaborators in the fraud, but rather had been its victims. 90 
The BLMIS Fraud in Historical Context
Each fraud is context dependent, and has its own history; 95 nevertheless the recurrence 
of white-collar crime suggests that explanations for this unacceptable face of capitalism 
are not entirely dependent on fleeting circumstances. In criminology, offender profiling 
has sought to produce characteristics and to theorize individual motivations and 
situational phenomena to explain the persistence white-collar crimes. 96 Criminologists 
have built on these foundations to develop a number of theories to explain white-collar 
crime 97 For example, Ponzi in the euphoria of the booming twenties and Madoff in the 
neo-liberalism or casino capitalism of the turn of the twentieth century can be 
understood with reference to ‘Institutional Anomie Theory’. This theoretical lens 
explains white-collar crime with reference to a macro-level analysis, which contends 
that contemporary societal norms over-promoted values associated with financial 
success and materialism, while under-promoting ethical values and the legality. The 
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legitimacy of this theoretical perspective is illustrated by the ubiquity of investment 
Ponzi fraud that were running in parallel with BMLS. 98 This observation can be 
illustrated further with reference to earlier fraudsters such as  Ponzi, and his inspiration 
520% Miller  who were merely the most infamous in a series of contemporary ‘Get Rich 
Quick’ con artists in the US who followed ‘… a three step playbook: splash, cash, and 
dash. That is make a big impression, grab as much money as possible and dash.’ 99 
White collar criminal profiling, akin to all criminal profiling is an inexact science, but the 
consensus is that these criminals do not exhibit a homogenous profile. 100 Thus there is no 
white-collar criminal archetype, though successful white-collar criminal do tend to exhibit a 
number of behavioural traits and Madoff possessed this ‘grift sense’, which enabled him to 
‘exploit inter-relationship weaknesses’ 101 for which there are historical antecedents. For 
example, John Law infamous for his ‘Mississippi Scheme’ resembled Madoff, in being a 
charismatic and immaculately dressed crowd pleaser (super-networker) who could inspire 
trust, as well as being an inveterate gambler, adept at the study of numbers. 102 Madoff was an
also an accomplished and disciplined performer 103 bonds with his investors, as individuals 
(ego-centric) and as an embedded member of a community (socio-centric).  Typically, the 
investors would bond with Madoff, but this bond would never be reciprocated, though as a 
disciplined performer Madoff would give the impression that the bond was fully reciprocated.
Moreover, this emotional bond both facilitated the fraud and protected Madoff, as the 
investors relied on it as a marker for trust, rather than a more orthodox financial approach of 
carrying out due diligence on their investments. 104
Conclusion
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The article’s conclusion is that white-collar crime in general, including investment fraud 
throughout the age’s share recurring social capital characteristics, which include certain 
fraudster traits and operating strategies. Thus, while each fraud retains its own history, that is 
it has its unique character and contemporary features, there are also discernable recurring 
social capital characteristics. The article has also discussed Madoff with reference to other 
white-collar criminals to explicate whether he was the latest incarnation of a recurring 
criminal type, or whether as the victims’ plea statements claim, he was ‘the devil incarnate’. 
 
Madoff resembled other fraudster as a master at exploiting the dis-utilities of social capital 
and hence his crimes were predicated on sophisticated socio-economic insights into social 
interaction, as well as human behaviours and characteristics. This article’s social capital 
perspective complements criminology literature by examining crime’s human factors and 
draws attention to the resources that inhered in the fraudsters social interactions and 
structures, in what remains the most heavily regulated industry in America. In consequence, 
the originality of this article has been to consider the recurring features of fraud from a social 
capital perspective, which expands criminology’s SNA approach of investigating the 
exploitative and deleterious effects of social networks; but also presents an expanded 
perspective that emphasizes the persistent social (capital) realities of social interaction in 
white-collar crime.  The article has also examined the more qualitative embedded, relational 
social realities that are built up over time, through reiterated interactions to create the social 
fabric of criminal network structures. From this perspective the article has demonstrated that 
social capital analysis can move beyond its theoretical orthodoxy of Montesque’s ‘doux 
commerce’.110 Thus the frequent criticism that social capital presents a soft and consensual 
view of benign capitalism has been addressed by examining how social capital processes are 
able to facilitate dis-utilities, such as white-collar crime.
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The article’s analysis suggest that although there were unusual features of the BLMIS case, 
for example to do with the length of operation, scale and scope of the fraud’s reach, more 
striking though are its commonplace features.  Madoff and his fraud was thus ‘a product and 
agent of the historical process.’ 111 In sum, Madoff was not ‘sui generis’ but more accurately 
can be thought of as personifying an epoch of unethical financial hubris that ended with the 
financial crisis that began in 2007, for illustration: 
‘Besides the Madoff saga, Marquet International, a consultancy, has identified more 
than 300 sizeable Ponzi schemes from the past ten years, with combined losses for 
investors of $23 billion. It estimates that up to half of those were affinity-based. No 
one has a reliable number for smaller frauds over the same period, but guesses range 
from $5 billion to $20 billion. In all, affinity-fraud losses in America could be as 
much as $50 billion’ (Economist, 2012; 28th January). 
To conclude, Madoff’s willingness to embrace his notoriety, and the willingness and the 
ability of his investors to cast him as the ‘devil’ are the most unusual aspects of his fraud. In 
most respects he was just another con man. 
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